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ENEMIES TO INNOVATION: PROTECTING
BIOTECHNOLOGY INVENTIONS
Elizabeth F. Enayati
I. INTRODUCTION
In the words of Joseph Addison,' "When men are easy in their
circumstances, they are naturally enemies to innovation."2 In rec-
ognition of this exigency, the Framers of the U.S. Constitution pro-
vided a means for motivating and rewarding authors and inventors
by incorporating in the Constitution protective provisions for their
respective writings and inventions.3
Is the protection that was envisioned in the 1700's adequate for
modem technology, specifically, for biotechnology? Not as it
stands to date. The world market for bioteclnological products is
projected to reach between $40 and $100 billion within the next 15
years.4 At the present market growth rate, the product life-cycle of
a drug is 8 - 12 years and getting shorter.' In light of this time-
frame, there is an urgency on the part of pharmaceutical companies
to obtain fast legal protection for their products.
There is currently a two-and-a-half year wait before a biotech-
nology-related patent application is reviewed by a Patent Exam-
iner.6 This is, in part, due to the lack of Examiners qualified to
review such applications. Ultimately, the responsibility falls on the
legislature to respond to the increased flow of biotechnology-related
patent applications.
Legislative action in response to the increase in biotechnology-
related inventions has been slow in coming. There are now plans in
effect to expand the chemistry division, adding more Examiners
1. Joseph Addison (1672-1719), English poet, essayist and intellectual who was a ma-
jor infludnee on English public opinion. I ENCY. AMERICANA 155 (1981).
2. B. EvANs, DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS (1978) (citing J. ADDISON, THE FREE-
HOLDER No. 42).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 8, provides: "To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries."
4. Figg, Biotechnology: Science Fiction Becomes a Legal Reality, THE COMPLEAT
LAW., winter 1986, at 29.
5. Patently Outdated, THE ECONOMIST, July 18, 1987, at 17.
6. Crawford, Patent Claim Buildup Haunts Biotechnology, SCENCE, Feb. 12, 1988, at
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with a background in biotechnology-related education.7 Failure on
the part of the legislature to provide adequate protection for inven-
tions in biotechnology will have the short-term effect of loss of mar-
ket position for individual inventors and companies, and the long-
term effect of discouraging investment in research.8
Existing intellectual property laws9 are inadequate to protect
inventions in biotechnology,' 0 and restrict access to information
among scientists. For reasons discussed in this comment, current
intellectual property law can best protect the needs of the innova-
tive biotechnology frontier in the form of a statutory hybrid of two
areas of existing legal protection: patent and copyright law.
This comment includes: 1) definitions of some terms and tech-
niques used in the biotechnology industry; 2) a brief survey of the
relevant areas of patent and copyright law, including a synopsis of
key cases decided in these fields; and 3) a proposed Amendment to
35 U.S.C. section 1-900, attached as an Appendix.
The Appendix, a proposed Amendment to Title 35, is the focal
point of this comment. It has been drafted in an attempt to address
the key issues and problems posed by the existing patent and copy-
right laws which have, in a sense, become "enemies of innovation."
II. TERMS AND TECHNIQUES
A. Biotechnology
"Biotechnology" is a term which has been used to describe sci-
entific endeavors for decades. Although not a new term, biotech-
nology techniques today are new and often controversial. 1 Modem
7. The application to the April, 1989 Patent Agent Examination adds the following
fields to its list of accepted degrees: biology, botany, food technology, microbiology, pharma-
cology as well as biomedical and computer engineering. See also infra note 120 and accompa-
nying text
8. Id. It is important to bear in mind that there are numerous government agencies
involved in the approval of biotechnology and pharmaceutical products, the involvement and
impact of which is beyond the scope of this comment. For example, the Food and Drug
Administration, the National Science Foundation, the Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration, the Environmental Health Administration and the National Institute of Health.
See also Lavelle, Biotecih The Unknown Frontier for Lawyers, THE NAT'L LAw J., Feb. 6,
1989, at 1.
9. Intellectual property laws relevant to this area of discussion shall include patent,
copyright and trade secret law.
10. Biotechnology, as used in this comment, is defined as the human manipulation of
living organisms with the intent of manufacturing a commercially viable or otherwise utilita-
rian product.
11. See Comment, A New Twist in the Double Helix." Admissibility of DNA "Finger-
printing" in California, 5 COMPUTER & HIGH-TECH. L. J. [this issue] (for a discussion on the
admissibility of DNA "fingerprinting" as evidence).
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use of the term "biotechnology," particularly as used in this com-
ment, refers to recombinant DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid),
monoclonal antibody technology and similar technology primarily
used in the pharmaceutical industry. The end-result of such labora-
tory manipulation may take the form of a genetic sequence inten-
tionally encoded in the DNA. It may also take the form of. 1) a
substance which will locate and attach to designated cells; 2) a
means of mass producing a particular cell line; or 3) a new chemical
marketable as a drug. 12
Biotechnology research and product development primarily
centers around the antibody-antigen reaction. This reaction is a
major factor in every individual's immune system. An antibody is a
molecule comprised of a particular type of protein13 which is pro-
duced in response to and specifically binds to discrete particles, an-
tigens, 4 which may be on a cell surface. Antibodies are produced
by B-cells, manufactured primarily in bone marrow. Once a B-cell
is committed to producing an antibody against a specific antigen, all
progeny of that B-cell line are equally committed to the production
of the identical antibody.'5
Harvesting the natural by-product of specific cell types, part of
a process known as tissue culturing, became routine in the 1950's.
The barrier encountered by researchers using such techniques was
the finite life-span of a cell in culture. All normal cells have an
average life-cycle in culture of approximately eight days. 6 Tumor
cells, however, have a potentially infinite life span in culture, and it
was soon discovered that by creating a hybrid 7 of a tumor cell with
a normal cell, called a hybridoma, the cell lines exhibiting a desired
characteristic could be perpetuated almost indefinitely. With the
development of hybridoma techniques, monoclonal antibody tech-
nology has grown to commercial proportions.'
12. See Glossary of Biotechnology Terms, 1 HIGH TECH. L. J. 253 (1986) for a more
complete listing of relevant terms.
13. An antibody is also called an "immunoglobulin" which is itself comprised of a
glycoprotein.
14. An antigen is a substance that can induce a detectable immune response when intro-
duced into an animal or human. D. STrrEs, J. STOBO, J. WELLS, BASIC CLINICAL IMMU-
NOLOGY 694 (6th ed. 1987).
15. HUMAN HYBRIDOMAS AND MONOCLONAL ANTIBODIES, (E.G.Engleman,
S.K.H.Fong, J.Larrick & A.Raubitschek ed. 1985).
16. B. ALBERTS, D. BRAY, J. LEwis, M. RAFF, K. ROBERTS & J. WATSON, MOLECU-
LAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL (1983).
17. One cell fused with another, resulting in a cell with some of the characteristics of
each contributing cell.
18. See Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1344, 1349 (N.D.
Cal. 1985) rev'd, 802 F.2d. 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 1606 (1987) (for an
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COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGYLAW JOURYAL
Cells which produce an antibody recognizing a known or de-
sired antigen are fused with mouse tumor cells (myelomas). The
hybridomas from this fusion result in cell lines of potentially infinite,
duration which multiply at a rapid rate, thus making harvesting of
the desired antibodies commercially feasible.
B. Genetic Engineering
"Genetic engineering" is an area of scientific endeavor different
from, though related to, the field of monoclonal antibody and my-
eloma technology. The term "genetic engineering" typically en-
compasses any number of techniques used for modifying the
nucleotide sequence 19 of a DNA strand.20
One technique used to change the nucleotide sequence is
known as "gene splicing." Similar to splicing a piece of film or re-
cording tape, a nucleotide strand of the DNA helix is "cut" (known
as "cleavage") using an enzyme specific for that region of DNA.
The strand is then replaced with a different string of nucleotides.21
This genetic form of "cutting-and-pasting" results in genetically al-
tered, or "engineered" plants and animals.22
III. PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW
Traditionally, protection for inventions and innovations in the
pharmaceutical and biotechnological arenas comes from patent
law. 3 What is it that makes current patent law inadequate in these
excellent dissertation given by Judge Conti on the current understandings in immunology).
One example of the manner in which the above technology is put to use by pharmaceutical
and biotechnology companies is drug testing kits.
19. The nucleotides which comprise the DNA strand are thymine, guanine, adenine
and cytosine. These four nucleotides form specific pairs which then arrange in different com-
binations. The resulting sequence of these nucleotides form the "code" sequence for the
"building blocks" of proteins. In 1953, Watson and Crick announced that the DNA mole-
cule structure is that of double helix formed by these nucleotides lining up on opposite
strands, and bonding together in a unique manner.
20. DNA, deoxyribonucleic acid, carries the genetic "code" which determines the fea-
tures of most living organisms. Due to the fact that "genes" are the carriers of the informa-
tion contained in DNA, the act of changing the nucleotide sequence is also known as "genetic
engineering."
21. See generally U. GOODENOUGH, GENETICS (2d ed. 1978).
22. See generally Tomorrow's Animals, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 15, 1987; See also What
Do You Get If You Cross.. .?, THE ECOOMmIST, Aug. 15, 1987.
23. The literature on this topic extends from practical advice to outrage. See Horsley,
Research Pathfinder. Biotechnology and Law, 1 HIGH TECH. L. J. 209 (1986). See also R.
SALIWANCHIK, LEGAL PROTECTION FOR MICROBIOLOGICAL AND GENETIC ENGINEERING,
(1982); Casey & Moss, Intellectual Property Rights and Biotechnology, 27 IDEA 251 (1986);
Danis, Patents for Biotechnology, 26 IDEA 263 (1985).
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fields? The answer is found in the statute, in current Patent Office
practice, and in recent cases as discussed below.
Copyright law, though not intuitively applicable to technical
innovations such as inventions in biotechnology, contains some pro-
visions and approaches which may be applicable to the field of bio-
technology. Specifically, the copyright law contains some statutory
definitions and provisions which may be applicable to DNA se-
quences. Recent copyright cases on the "look and feel" issue may
offer some insights into analytical approaches to protecting the end-
products of genetic engineering. 4
A. Patent Law
1. Statutory Subject Matter
The basic requirements for a successful patent application are
that the disclosed invention is: 1) within one of the statutory catego-
ries of allowable subject matter; 2) useful; 3) novel; 4) non-obvious;
and 5) adequately disclosed so as to enable designated persons to
use the invention.25
a. 35 U.S. C. § 101: Appropriate Subject Matter
An invention must fall within one of the statutory subject mat-
ters listed under 35 U.S.C. section 101.26 Products of microbiologi-
cal manipulation or genetic engineering have qualified as a
"composition of matter. ' 27
Patents for biotechnology-related inventions may also be ob-
tained as a "process" of obtaining a given composition of matter as
well as for the product itself.2 8 There are problems of scope inher-
ent in obtaining both types of patents.
One example of the problem of scope is found when a patent is
obtained on a process for producing an antibody, "Ab." The an-
tibody resulting from the process is specific for antigen "Ag," which
deactivates a certain virus. A researcher, working for a competitor
pharmaceutical company, identifies a process different from the pat-
24. A complete discussion of the "look and feel" issue is beyond the scope of this com-
ment. There is extensive literature and case law available on this topic.
25. See generally D. CHISUM, PATENrs (1987).
26. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1987) states: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
ment thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title."
27. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 65 L. Ed. 2d 144, 100 S. Ct. 2204
(1980) [hereinafter Diamond].
28. CRESPI, PATENTING IN THE BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 33 (1982).
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ented process, which results in production of antibody "Ab." The
patented process is not broad enough in scope to prevent the use of
the second researcher's process.
The problem of scope, as described in the example above,
makes researchers wary of disclosing their invention through pat-
ents. Although inventions in biotechnology have been fit into ex-
isting statutory categories, the resulting protection is not optimal.
b. 35 US.C. § 101: Utility
A further requirement of 35 U.S.C. section 101 is that the in-
vention have utility.29 As defined by Chisum, "Utility. . .means
that an invention must perform some function of positive benefit to
society."3 Utility must be demonstrated in the specification, can-
not be solely based on future use or even further research,31 and is
usually required to be demonstrated for a Patent Examiner beyond
the written specification.32
c. 35 U.S.C. § 102: Novelty
The novelty requirement of 35 U.S.C. section 10233 basically
29. See supra note 26.
30. CHiSUM, supra note 25, § 4.01, at 4-2. (Chisum states three tests which an inven-
tion must meet to satisfy the utility requirement: (1) it must be operable and capable of use;
(2) it must operate to achieve some minimum human purpose; and (3) it must achieve a
human purpose that is not illegal, immoral or contrary to public policy).
31. Id. at § 4.02(2) (1987) (discussing the Supreme Court case of Brenner v. Manson,
383 U.S. 519, 16 L. Ed. 2d 69, 86 S. Ct. 1033, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 689 (1966) a seminal case
in which the court held that a chemical process which produces a compound may be patented
only if the compound has "substantial utility," i.e. specific benefit in its currently available
form, beyond a mere interest for further scientific research).
32. CREsPi, supra note 28, at 103.
33. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1987) states:
Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to patent: A person shall
be entitled to a patent unless-
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the inven-
tion thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or
a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States, or
(c) he has abandoned the invention, or
(d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented, or was the sub-
ject of an inventor's certificate, by the applicant or his legal representatives or
assigns in a foreign country prior to the date of the application for patent in
this country on an application for patent or inventor's certificate filed more
than twelve months before the filing of the application in the United States, or
(e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an application for pat-
ent by another filed in the United States before the invention thereof by the
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requires that the inventor named in the patent is, in fact, the actual
inventor. A patent cannot issue on an invention which is based on
material known at the time of the invention, or which is already in
the public domain. An inventor cannot obtain the benefits of a pat-
ent grant if the invention was attributed to one other than the inven-
tor named in the patent.
To assure that the patent grant issues to the right person, a
Patent Examiner will conduct a search of all "prior art' 34 refer-
ences relating to an invention disclosed in an application. This re-
quirement does not pose unique difficulties for biotechnology
inventions.
d. 35 U.S.C. § 103: Non-obvious Subject Matter
There is also a statutory threshold "non-obvious subject mat-
ter ' 3 S requirement for inventions. The question is whether the in-
vention teaches "one skilled in the art" something that is not
already known or disclosed in prior patents or other publications. 36
The "non-obvious" requirement is based upon the level of expertise
of a person skilled in the art to which the invention pertains. 37 In a
young, highly dynamic field such as biotechnology, it is difficult to
ascertain the relevant level of expertise, primarily because it is con-
stantly shifting as new processes evolve. Inventors in this area must
applicant for patent, or on an international application by another who has
fulfilled the requirements of [international patent], or
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented, or
(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in this
country by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In
determining priority of invention there shall be considered not only the respec-
tive dates of conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also the
reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to
practice, from a time prior to conception by the other.
34. Prior art is a term of art referring to patents, or other publications generally avail-
able, which pertain to the field to which an invention relates.
35. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1987) states that:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed
or described as set forth in § 102 of this title, if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains.
36. CREspi, supra note 28, at 76.
37. See Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 230
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 416 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (in dicta, the following factors are listed as elements to
be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art: (1) educational level of the
inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions; (4) rapidity of
innovation; (5) sophistication of technology; and, (6) educational level of active workers in
the field).
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGYL4WJOURAL
ride out the learning curve for attorneys and Patent Examiners who
must remain abreast of the dynamic field to adequately review pat-
ent applications.38
The non-obvious requirement, though an issue for every
claimed invention, has raised particular problems in the area of ge-
netically engineered plants39 and animals.' Conceptually, it is easy
to understand that a genetically engineered animal may be consid-
ered obvious: a mouse, is a mouse, etcetera.
Along this same line of review, particularly relevant to inven-
tions in biotechnology, is the prohibition against granting patents
on "products of nature."'" There are several ways to circumvent a
"product of nature" objection to an application for a biotechnology
invention. One way is to discover a new use, and to obtain a pro-
cess or method patent for the new use. Another way is to signifi-
cantly alter the form of the product, thus qualifying the result as a
composition of matter.42
Process and method claims have also encountered the non-ob-
viousness obstacle, usually expressed in terms of whether or not the
results are "unexpected." For example, in one case, claims were
made to the preparation of monoclonal antibodies capable of de-
tecting malignant human renal cells by well-established hybridoma
technology.4 3 The Patent Examiner in the case cited, inter alia, the
hybridoma method that was discovered by Kohler and Milstein, as
reported in Nature magazine ten years prior to the application. The
Board, in reversing the Examiner's rejection, emphasized that
although the technique was well-known in the field, the results ob-
tained were unexpected and, thus, the inventors were able to obtain
a patent.
38. See Rauh and Jaenichen, Novelty and Inventive Step in Inventions having Proteins or
DNA Sequences as their Subject Matter, 70 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 313 (May 1988) (in which the
authors conclude: "[A] protein can no longer be considered new if the parameters indicated
in the state of the art are sufficient to unambiguously identify it, and accordingly to indicate
further parameters would only protect a new definition, but not now [sic] a new product.").
39. See Comment, Patents, Plants & Biotechnology - Policy and Law, 14 WESTERN
STATE U. L. REv. 529 (1987).
40. See supra note 22.
41. For a complete discussion of this issue, including relevant cases, see CHisuM, supra
note 25, at § 1.02(7). See also Bjozicevic, Distinguishing "Products of Nature"From Products
Derived From Nature, 69 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 415 (1987).
42. See, eg., Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp.
1379, 3 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1481 (N.D. Cal. 1987), on motion for reconsideration, 678 F.
Supp. 1429, 6 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1018 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (in which the court held that a
purified and concentrated form of naturally occurring molecules, Factor VIII:C, was not a
product of nature, hence patentable).
43. Exparte Old, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 196 (PTBA 1985).
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It is not difficult to identify the obstacles facing a research sci-
entist who has discovered a commercially viable, antibody-produc-
ing mutant microorganism. As the field develops, patents on
inventions using hybridoma technology will become narrower in
scope to satisfy the statutory requirements. Due to the ambiguity
and inadequacy of existing laws, the courts have been forced to
draw and enforce their own guidelines.
To date, the Supreme Court has heard only one case in this
area of intellectual property law, Diamond v. Chakrabarty,44 dis-
cussed below. From that single case, it can be surmised that the
court is willing to look at the degree of human intervention involved
in an invention, or innovation, in making its determination whether
or not the statutory threshold questions of novelty and non-obvi-
ousness have been satisfactorily answered.
The proposed Amendment found in the Appendix, is designed
to reduce, if not eliminate, such technically cloaked judicial guess-
work. However, until such an amendment is implemented, the
practitioner must be ever vigilant and diligent in ferreting out the
guidelines for obtaining patents in biotechnology from the cases as
they are decided. Legislative activism on the part of patent attor-
neys may be the best way to assure that guidelines are clear and that
protection is in the inventor's best interest.
2. The Patent Application Process
Once it is determined that an invention for which a patent is
sought falls within the statutory subject matter requirements, the
difficult process of filing an acceptable application begins. The furor
over the inadequacy of current patent law for protecting the interest
of scientists, pharmaceutical companies and consumers reaches a
deafening roar concerning the application requirements.
Three basic filing requirements are enumerated in 35 U.S.C.
section 111. 41 Historically, these requirements, specifically the en-
abling disclosure requirement, 46 raised serious obstacles to patent
44. Diamond, 447 U.S. 303.
45. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1987) states: "1) a specification as prescribed in section 112 of this
title; 2) a drawing as prescribed by section 113 of this title; and 3) an oath by the applicant as
prescribed by section 115 of this title."
46. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1987) states:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his
invention...
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applications for inventions in biotechnology. As discussed below, a
series of cases has given some definitive resolution to the questions
of when, and what materials to deposit to satisfy the enabling dis-
closure requirement.47
There are factors which are changing the application process
for biotechnology inventions. For example, patent attorneys are be-
coming more familiar with the language necessary to write valid
claims as they see more biotechnology-related cases through their
practice. The disclosure requirements can be satisfied with more
certainty now that they are understood and generally accepted. In
an area of law which was historically dominated by engineers,48 the
language of the biochemist and hybridoma technician was as for-
eign as an unexplored country.
3. Recent Patent Cases
a. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103
Two cases seemingly collide over the issue of what constitutes
"anticipated" or "obvious" subject matter under Sections 102 and
103: Exparte Old4 9 and Exparte Goodall." In the former case, the
claims of the applicant's patent covered monoclonal antibodies re-
cognizing enumerated human renal cell antigenic systems, cell lines
producing specified antibodies, and a method for differentiating be-
tween malignant and normal cells. All three types of claims were
rejected on the basis of prior patents disclosing the preparation of
monoclonal antibodies and disclosing polyclonal antibodies which
react with cell surface antigens such as those in the claims in Old's
patent. The Board reversed this rejection, allowing all claims,
stating:
Although this technique underlying hybridoma technology is
well recognized, nevertheless, the results obtained by its use
clearly are unpredictable. Hybridoma technology is an empirical
art in which the routineer is unable to foresee what particular
antibodies will be produced and which specific surface antigens
47. See Aisenberg, Depositing Cell Lines to Satisfy Enablement Requirements, 27 IDEA
149 (1986); In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 168 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 99 (CCPA 1970) (hereinaf-
ter Argoudelis). But see Schneider, Microorganisms and the Patent Office: To Deposit or not
to Deposit, That is the Question, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 592 (1984).
48. See 37 C.F.R. § 10.7 (1988) (which specifies the qualifications required for someone
practicing before the Patent and Trademark Office).
49. Ex parte Old, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 196 (PTBA 1985) [hereinafter Old].
50. Exparte Goodall, 799 F.2d 867, 231 U.S,P.Q. (BNA) 831 (PTBA 1986) [hereinaf-
ter Goodall].
[Vol. 5
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will be recognized by them.5 1
The Board further noted, as did the appellants, that:
.if the art of monoclonal antibodies to cancer antigens were
routine and predictable then the Kohler-Milstein discovery [cited
as the publication which makes Old's, invention obvious] would
make obvious all monoclonal antibodies to cancer antigens and
the field of cancer immunology would have routinely produced
cancer cures.
52
Thus, the Board held that, as with chemical products, if an end-
product of a known process is a demonstrably unexpected result of
that process, that end-product may properly be patented.
Disregarding the guidelines of Old, the Board in Goodall came
to a contrary decision. It rejected a patent application containing
claims for a monoclonal antibody specific to a hepatitis-B surface
antigen. The basis for the Board's rejection was that the invention
was anticipated under Section 103.:
The prior art relied upon by the Board in sustaining the Exam-
iner's rejection was a patent disclosing the formation of hybridomas
from an antigen and cell line apparently identical to those used by
the appellant. The Board held that, although the processes were
not identical, the resulting antibodies would have been obvious from
the antibody disclosed in the prior art. 4 Unfortunately, the opinion
is not rich in the Board's explanation of its method for arriving at
its conclusion. It is possible that the appellant could have won this
ease had it demonstrated that the monoclonal antibody was an un-
expected result of the prior art processes.
The most recent case addressing, inter alia, section 102 and 103
requirements is Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.. In
this case, Hybritech had filed suit against Monoclonal Antibodies,
Inc. alleging that immunometric assays 6  which utilized
monoclonal antibodies and which were marketed and sold by
51. Old, 229 U.S.P.Q. at 200.
52. Id.
53. It is worth noting that claim 1, upon which the rejection of all claims was based,
was for the monoclonal antibody itself, not the process. The Board, in dictum, stated:
"[E]ven were claims to appellants' hybridoma and antibody found to be allowable, the patent-
ability of the process of producing the hybridoma and the antibody and using the antibody
would still be in question." Goodall, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 831.
54. Id. at 832.
55. Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1344, 227 U.S.P.Q.
215 (N.D. Cal. 1985) rev'd, 802 F.2d. 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1606
(1987) [hereinafter Hybritech].
56. Immunometric assays are techniques for quantitatively measuring the antibody to
antigen responses, usually in the form of a kit containing the necessary reagents. Generally,
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Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., infringed a Hybritech patent. The
Hybritech patent was on a process for determining the presence or
amount of antigen in a fluid sample using a "sandwich" or "two-
site" method. 7 Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc. successfully defended
against the infringement claim. The Hybritech patent was declared
invalid under Sections 102, 103 and 112.58
On appeal,59 the decision was reversed. After admonishing the
District Court for adopting, as its opinion, Monoclonal's pre-trial
brief and findings of fact, Judge Rich, for the Court, applied the
classic Graham v. John Deere Co. 6I test to determine "obviousness"
under Section 103; i.e., whether the claimed invention would have
been obvious at the time the invention was made. The factual in-
quiries necessary in such determinations are: 1) scope and content
of prior art; 2) level of ordinary skill in the art; and 3) difference
between the prior art and the claimed invention."1 The Court also
stressed the importance of secondary considerations62 in evaluating
the obviousness rejection.
The Hybritech decision set forth some clear standards for in-
ventions in biotechnology. The Court made the statement, "The
mere existence of prior art disclosing how to measure the affinity of
high affinity monoclonal antibodies is insufficient to support a hold-
ing of obviousness."63 It then concluded that since Hybritech
claimed the process employing monoclonal antibodies, and not
merely the antibody itself, this was sufficient to distinguish it from
some prior art references.
On the other hand, the Court stated that while the seminal
work of Kohler and Milstein "paved the way for a supply of
monoclonal antibodies,"" it did not suggest the use of monoclonal
antibodies in the manner used in the Hybritech patent. This state-
ment, combined with testimony at the trial to the effect that the
these are either diagnostic tools used in clinical laboratories or research tools used in research
laboratories.
57. Hybritech, 623 F. Supp. at 1346.
58. Id. at 1356-57.
59. Hybritech, 802 F.2d 1367, 1385.
60. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 13-14, 15 L. Ed. 2d 545, 86 S. Ct. 684
(1966) [hereinafter Graham].
61. Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1379-80; See also Graham, 383 U.S. at 17 (1966).
62. Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1380 states: "Objective evidence such as commercial suc-
cess, failure of others, long-felt need, and unexpected results must be considered BEFORE a
conclusion on obviousness is reached and is not merely 'icing on the cake.'" [citations omit-
ted] [Emphasis in original].
63. Id. at 1381.
64. Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1380.
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Hybritech diagnostic kits embodying the disputed invention unex-
pectedly solved a long-standing problem, led the Court to find that
the Hybritech invention was not obvious. 65
b. 35 U.S.C. § 112
The landmark decision of In re Argoudelis, DeBoer, Eble and
Herr,66 sets the stage for the current practice of depositing cultures
of microorganisms in a public depository prior to filing an applica-
tion. At present, deposit is necessary to satisfy the enablement re-
quirements of Section 112.67
The applicant in Argoudelis claimed two new antibiotic com-
pounds and a microbiological process. Prior to filing with the Pat-
ent and Trademark Office (PTO), applicants deposited two agar
plates of the microorganism producing the antibiotic compounds
with the U.S. Department of Agriculture. A cover letter was in-
cluded with the deposit, requesting that the depository withhold
distribution of the organism to the public until notified by the in-
ventors. Notification was to be sent pending patent registration.
The claims relating to the organism on deposit were rejected by the
Patent Examiner as failing to satisfy the Section 112 specification
requirements.
The Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals (PTBA)
agreed with the Examiner, affirming the rejection of the claims.
Finding the deposit to be satisfactory disclosure, the Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals (CCPA)68 reversed.
At issue was whether applicants were required to make the de-
posited culture available to the public at the time of filing. The
Court held that it was unnecessary for the public to have access to
the deposited material prior to issuance of a patent. It further stated
that the "possibility that the disclosure may someday become non-
enabling.. .does not render the disclosure insufficient under section
112. '69 The CCPA recognized that a unique aspect of using micro-
organisms as starting materials is that a sufficient description of
65. There were eight conclusions of law stated in Hybritech, 623 F. Supp at 1355, in-
cluding invalidation of the Hybritech patent under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(g), 103, 112 and 113
(indefinite claims). The Circuit Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit (hereinafter CAFC) re-
versed the decision on all conclusions of law.
66. Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390.
67. See supra note 46.
68. The Court of Customs and Patents Appeals [hereinafter CCPA] was the court for
appellate review of Patent and Trademark Office [hereinafter PTO] decisions prior to 1982.
In 1982, the CAFC was established, replacing the CCPA in all matters.
69. Argoudelis, 434 F.2d at 1394.
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how to obtain the microorganism from nature cannot be given.70
The concurring opinion by Judge Baldwin points out the con-
cern of patent law expressed in Section 112. Considering the fact
that patents are the granting of legal monopoly, the public must
receive something in return, thus adding a "measure of worthwhile
knowledge to the public storehouse."71 Judge Baldwin then con-
cluded that as long as one of ordinary skill in the art is able to make
and use the claimed compounds at the time the patent issues, Sec-
tion 112 is satisfied by the conditional deposit of materials.72
Relying on the dicta in Argoudelis (stating that the particular
area of technology involved defied description by written word) the
PTBA in Ex parte Jackson73 affirmed the Patent Examiner's final
rejection of a claim for a new species of microorganism which con-
tained neither a deposit number nor adequate description.74 Appli-
cants had discovered three bacterial strains producing a new
antibiotic. The claim for the end-product antibiotic (claim 1) was
allowed, but the process claims (claims 2-6) for producing the new
bacterial strains were rejected by the Examiner as failing to ade-
quately disclose the invention under Section 112.
Although applicants had deposited cultures with a recognized
depository, claim 2 relied solely upon a written disclosure, not upon
the deposited material for purposes of Section 112. The deposited
material was identified with claims 3-6. The Board allowed claims
3-6. Unfortunately, claim 2 was the process claim upon which
claims 3-6 relied. Since the starting material for claim 2 was not
deposited, only the end-product of the claim 2 process, the claim
failed to satisfy the disclosure requirements of Section 112 and all
claims were finally rejected.
Jackson expands on the dicta and holding of Argoudelis. The
Board clarified the enablement requirement of Section 112 as al-
lowing a person skilled in the art to reproduce the end-products, in
this case the claimed antibiotics.75 It is apparent that the inventors
were attempting to avoid the deposit requirement by filing one pat-
ent and depositing only the starting materials for the claimed
bacteria.76
70. Id. at 1392.
71. Id. at 1394 (J. Baldwin, concurring).
72. Id. at 1396.
73. Ex parte Jackson, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 805 (PTBA 1982) [hereinafter Jackson].
74. Id. at 806.
75. Id. at 809 (Katz, concurring).
76. For example, microbiological manipulation of A results in B bacteria which pro-
duces C antibiotic. Depositing only A would, theoretically, allow one skilled in the art to
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The conclusion which may be drawn from the Jackson decision
is that if one starts from a known common bacteria, A, and ade-
quately discloses a method of mutating A, it will be possible to
claim both the process and the end-product without depositing the
starting material. However, if mutant bacteria A is required to pro-
duce the end-product of a claimed process, bacteria B, the starting
material of A must be deposited to satisfy the disclosure require-
ments of Section 112.
The applicant in In re Lundak 77 believed that his cell lines had
been deposited with a recognized depository prior to the filing of his
patent application. In fact, the deposit was made too late. The
Commissioner denied the applicant's petition to change the filing
date. In addition, the Commissioner decided that the legal specifi-
cation requirements of Section 112 were not satisfied by deposit of
the cell lines at other Universities prior to filing.
On appeal, the Court held that Section 112 does not require the
deposit to precede filing, emphasizing that the deposit requirement
adds nothing to the description of the invention as expressly re-
quired by Section 112.78 This is consistent with the Argoudelis
decision.
Of most interest in Lundak are the statements made in a foot-
note to the majority opinion:
[We] observe that it is the public interest in the progress of the
useful arts that is benefitted as new technologies evolve. An in-
terpretation of the statute to deny patent rights in microbiologi-
cal inventions would be contrary to law. . .The PTO must
continue to adapt its procedures to facilitate the advance of sci-
ence and technology.79
Perhaps this footnote was in response to the Commissioner's seem-
ingly harsh treatment of Lundak by neither allowing him to change
his original filing date, nor allowing his deposits with a University
reproduce both B and C. The Board in this case broke the chain of events into two sub-
chains: A results in B; B produces C; therefore, both A and B must be deposited.
77. In re Lundak, 773 F.2d 1216, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 90 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (hereinafter
Lundak).
78. Id. at 95; But see Old, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 196 (PTBA 1985) (in which the Board
held that the monoclonal antibodies which were the subject matter of the claimed invention,
being indisputably reduced to practice prior to the filing date and which were to be deposited
at a recognized depository and which were presently being maintained at an institution of
reknown and integrity, satisfied 35 U.S.C. § 112 requirements, stating, "No more can be
asked of applicant.").
79. Lundak, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 93.
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to compensate for a bona fide error."0 Or perhaps it is a signal by
the Court that, at least in the area of biotechnological inventions
and discoveries, the PTO needs to be more flexible and less bureau-
cratic in its approach.
To summarize the deposit requirements, materials must be de-
posited when they supplement the written description of the inven-
tion contained in the application. Usually, this deposit requirement
arises when a microorganism, cell line or hybridoma necessary for
replicating a claimed process is not readily available to the public.
A deposit will be considered timely if it is made prior to issuance of
a patent on the matter.81
In drafting the proposed Amendment found in the Appendix,
these strong and often conflicting notions of fairness versus facilita-
tion of the advance of science were key issues to be resolved. As
was clearly expressed in Lundak, conflicts between the interests of
the public in scientific advancement and the private interests of an
inventor in personal advancement and economic gain, permeate this
area of law. In fact, it is in the public's interest that scientific ad-
vances are recognized and protected under the Constitution.82 Leg-
islative action is appropriate to alleviate tensions created by such
conflict.
c. The Scope of Biotechnology Protection:
Diamond v. Chakrabarty
Diamond v. Chakrabarty83 is the only U.S. Supreme Court
case to date specifically addressing the scope of legal protection as it
extends to inventions in biotechnology. It is the subject matter of
numerous reviews, analyses and subsequent court decisions.8 4 As a
key case in the area of biotechnology, it merits mention in any dis-
cussion of law as applied to discoveries or inventions in
biotechnology.
The issue before the court was strictly limited to whether
Chakrabarty's microorganism constituted a "manufacture" or
"composition of nature" within the meaning of section 101.85
80. Lundak had apparently believed his cell line had been deposited before filing, when
in fact it was not made until seven days after filing. Id. at 92.
81. For an excellent discussion of the deposit requirement, complete with examples, see
Wiseman, The Need for Deposits, A.B.A., Ann. Meeting (Aug. 11, 1987).
82. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
83. Diamond, 447 U.S. 303.
84. For a list of references see Research Pathfinder Biotechnology and Law, I HIGH
TECH. L. J. 233 (1986).
85. See supra note 26.
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Chakrabarty had created a new microorganism by fusing four dif-
ferent plasmids. The end-product was a microorganism which
could be used to degrade crude oil spills. Indisputably the product
of human manipulation, the fact that the "invention" was a living
organism made it appear as though it was a "composition of
nature."
86
The impact of the Chakrabarty decision on the future of legal
protection for inventions and innovations in biotechnology is poten-
tially far-reaching. The basic holding is that for inventions in bio-
technology, the relevant query lies in distinguishing between
products of nature and man-made inventions. The query does not
end with the mere determination that a claimed invention is either
living or inanimate.87
At the very least, the Chakrabarty holding concedes that future
inventions in biotechnology will be afforded some protection. Still
to be determined is the amount of protection a court will be willing
to grant. The legislature is taking up the fight for such leading-edge
biotechnology inventions, with numerous bills affording or limiting
the rights to inventions in biotechnology."8 The scope of protection
is broadening, but it remains to be seen whose interests are being
protected in the process.
B. Copyright Law
It has been proposed that genetically engineered organisms are
within the bounds of copyright protection. 9 There is a strong argu-
ment for allowing scientists to copyright the DNA sequence of a
"new" organism: just as a composer may be able to copyright the
sequence of notes transcribed on a sheet of paper, so, too, may a
scientist copyright the nucleotide sequence comprising the key ele-
ment of the "new" organism.90
86. See Daus, Patents for Biotechnology, 26 IDEA 263, 276 (1985).
87. Id. at 277.
88. The most recent bills presented concerning animal patenting issues are those intro-
duced by Rep. R.W. Kastenmeier on March 22, 1989: "Transgenic Animal Patent Reform
Act" (HR 1556); and "Transgenic Animal Regulatory Reform Act" (HR 1557). The bills
propose to grant an exception to the patent laws to allow farmers the right to breed and sell
patented animals without the threat of infringement. Two Bills and OTA Report Address
Animal Patenting Issues, 37 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 923, at 521 (March
23, 1989). The issues raised by the grant of patent protection for genetically altered animals
are too numerous to be adequately addressed in this comment.
89. Kayton, Copyright in Living Genetically Engineered Works, 50 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 191 (1982) (Kayton analogizes DNA sequences of genetically engineered works to com-
puter programs. Kayton applies the statutory copyright requirements to protecting amino
acid sequences which comprise DNA strands).
90. An organism formed by fusing or genetically engineering nucleotides into a known
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Although it is easier to obtain a copyright (there is no intense
review of the materials registered under copyright laws) and the
protection is granted for a longer period of time,91 patent protec-
tion is usually preferred over the protection of copyright laws. The
primary reason for this preference is that the scope of protection
provided under patent law is broader than that provided under
copyright laws.92
1. Statutory Subject Matter
Subject matter of copyright protection, as outlined in 17 U.S.C.
section 102,91 essentially need satisfy only two criteria for registra-
tion: 1) the work must be original; and, 2) the work must be "fixed"
in a tangible medium of expression. Compared with the require-
ments for obtaining patent protection, the scrutiny by the Registrar
of Copyrights is de minimus. The effect given such protection has
basically been developed through common law, and is beyond the
scope of this discussion.
Modem copyright law has been challenged recently with re-
spect to protection of computer software. On its face, a straightfor-
ward application of an "original work" (the computer program),
"fixed" in a medium (the computer code) leads to copyright protec-
tion. The issue has arisen, however, whether the "look and feel," or
how the software actually appears to the end user, is also protected
under copyright law.94 A seminal case, Whelan Associates, Inc. v.
and intentional sequence is expressed in a manner as unique as the musical expression of
notes on a sheet of paper. For proof, look around at the variety in expression in the human
race.
91. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1987) (Copyright protection basically extends for the life of the
owner plus fifty years, whereas most patents have a term of 17 years from the date of issu-
ance. In the case of joint work, the term is fifty years beyond the life of the last surviving
author. In the case of anonymous, pseudonymous or work for hire, as would exist in a corpo-
ration, the term is 75 years from the year of first publication, or 100 years beyond the year of
its creation, whichever expires first).
92. A side-by-side analysis between patent protection and copyright protection is be-
yond the scope of this discussion. One distinction, however, is that after the intensive review
of patent applications, the patent holder receives a presumption of validity for the patent.
The copyright registrant has no such presumption upon registration. Also, patent law pro-
vides protection against "innocent infringers," whereas copyright law does not provide pro-
tection against independent creation.
93. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1987) states: "Copyright protection subsists, in accordance
with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,
now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device."
94. The term "look and feel" usually refers to the look of the screen when the computer
program is in operation, how the various "menus" prompt the user, or even how the informa-
tion being supplied by the user is stored and accessed by the hardware of the computer.
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Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc. 91 has held that copyright protection
may be extended beyond the specific code of the computer program.
The problems encountered in this area of copyright law find mirror
images in patent protection for biotechnology. The present state of
copyright law as it pertains to computer software and firmware is in
a state of morass similar to that of patent law as it pertains to bio-
technology, with modem courts struggling to establish clear guide-
lines for resolution. 96
Congress recognized the problem of protecting computer-re-
lated products under the Copyright Act of 1946 and has enacted
legislation to extend protection into an especially troubled area of
law: mask works.97 Although appended to the Copyright Act as
found in Title 17, the Semiconductor Chip Act defines and de-
scribes new subject matter of protection, provides for a severely lim-
ited duration (ten years as compared with the life-plus-fifty years for
other copyright protected works) and enumerates the scope of
protection. 98
2. Recent Copyright Cases
There are three recent, significant cases concerning the scope
of copyright protection for computer software: Whelan Associates,
Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc. ,99 Broderbund Software, Inc.
v. Unison World," and Digital Communications Associates, Inc. v.
95. Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 230
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481 (3rd Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Whelan].
96. See Design Patents" A New Form of Intellectual Property Protection for Computer
Software, 70 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 12 (1988) (which discusses the current trend of protecting
software through design patent laws). The use of design patent law to protect inventions in
biotechnology remains an unexplored area, and is beyond the scope of this comment.
97. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1987) (known as the Semiconductor Chip Act of 1984);
17 U.S.C. § 901a(2)(A) and (B) (1987) defines mask work as: "A series of related
images.. .having or representing the predetermined, three-dimensional pattern of metallic,
insulating, or semiconductor material.. .in which series the relation of the images to one
another is that each image has the pattern of the surface of one form of the semiconductor
chip product."
98. This author is unaware of any cases, to date, which have been brought under the
Semiconductor Chip Act. This may be an indication that the scope of protection provided is
adequate for resolving necessary issues. For a more complete discussion of the issues arising
under 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1987), see Pinheiro & LaCroix, Protecting the "Look and Feel"
of Computer Software, I HIGH TECH. L. J. 411 (1987). See also Kastenmeier & Remington,
The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984: A Swamp or Firm Ground? 70 MINN. L.
REV. 417 (1985).
99. Whelan, 797 F.2d 1222.
100. Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, 648 F. Supp. 1127, 231 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 700 (N.D. Cal. 1986) [hereinafter Broderbund].
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Softklone Distributing Corporation.1 Each case has been discussed
in several articles and commentaries since their respective decisions.
However, the final outcome of this "family" of cases is significant to
the potential applicability of copyright law to inventions in
biotechnology.
The Whelan"' case was the seminal case in a string of so-
called "look and feel" cases as applied to computer software. It
extended protection of a copyright beyond the literal code subject to
copyright, to a program written in a different computer language.
In biotechnology, this would be analogous to the situation described
previously in which a researcher was able to "mimic" the effects of
a specific monoclonal antibody, "Ab," using a process other than a
patented process.
The second case in this area, Broderbund,103 deals with alleged
audiovisual copyright infringement."° The Court in that case took
a large step towards granting "look and feel" protection of com-
puter programs. The Unison defense was primarily based upon the
axiom that if an idea is indistinguishable from its expression, the
expression cannot obtain protection under copyright laws.' 05 The
invocation of this merger doctrine poses a major obstacle to the pro-
tection of biotechnology inventions under copyright laws. For ex-
ample, if it can be shown that the only way to make antibody "Ab"
is by genetically engineering one specific amino acid sequence in a
DNA strand, that sequence would fall outside the appropriate sub-
ject matter requirement.
The court in Digital 106 agreed with Whelan's conclusion that
copyright protection of a computer program extends beyond the lit-
101. Digital Communications Associates, Inc. v. Softklone Distributing Corporation,
659 F. Supp. 449, 2 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1385 (N.D. Ga. 1987) [hereinafter Digital].
102. In Whelan, the defendant, Jaslow, had originally hired the plaintiff, Whelan, to
write a program for its dental prosthetics business. In addition, Jaslow had agreed to market
Whelan's program. Jaslow eventually wrote a program for a different computer system
which performed the same functions in essentially the same manner (i.e., the menus were
almost identical). Jaslow's defense primarily consisted of the fact that the programs were
written in two different languages, therefore the allegedly infringing program was signifi-
cantly different from the copyrighted program.
103. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. 1127.
104. In Broderbund, the plaintiff, Broderbund, claimed that the overall appearance,
structure and sequence of defendant's (Unison) computer program infringed their copyright.
Unison challenged that the menu screens of the plaintiff's program were the idea, since any
interactive computer program in the particular area of application would look substantially
similar. The court rejected this argument, considering for comparison, inter alia, other com-
puter programs which did not have an identical screen structure.
105. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1131.
106. Digital, 659 F. Supp. 449.
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eral source and object code to include its structure, sequence and
organization. 10 7  However, the Digital court expressly rejects a
broad reading of Broderbund, stating that "copyright protection of
a computer program does not extend to screen displays generated
by the program." 10 8
In light of the, albeit cautious, broadening of copyright protec-
tion in the field of computer software, it is evident that the impor-
tance of protecting innovation and expression is a factor weighted
heavily by the courts. It follows, therefore, that inventions in bio-
technology should be given equal consideration.
In the recent decisions cited above, courts and legislature have
worked together to broaden the scope of protection in the young,
dynamic and complex computer industry. The biotechnology in-
dustry is no less lucrative, no less complex and certainly no less
deserving of legislative action in its behalf. Against this back-
ground, the Amendment to Title 35 found in the Appendix, is
proposed.
IV. DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED TITLE 35 AMENDMENT
In the discussion surrounding the passing of the Semiconduc-
tor Chip Protection Act of 1984, the House stated that:
The purpose of the legislation is to protect semiconductor chip
products in such a manner as to reward creativity, encourage in-
novation, research and investment in the semiconductor indus-
try, prevent piracy, while at the same time protecting the
public. 109
These same goals are reflected in the proposed Amendment to Title
35 as set forth in the Appendix.
A. Statutory Subject Matter
1. Definitions
The present definitions of patentable subject matter found at 35
107. Id. at 455. The plaintiff sought protection of a status screen display for a software
package. It had obtained copyright registration on the computer program, user's manual and
each status screen display. Defendant, without copying either the underlying computer pro-
gram or user's manual, created a status screen substantially similar to that of the plaintiffs'.
Plaintiffs sued for infringement of its copyrights on both the computer program and status
screen displays. The court refused to find infringement of the computer program, but did
hold that the status screen displays were capable of copyright protection and, as such, were
infringed by the defendant's status screen displays.
108. Id.
109. H.R. REp. No. 781, 98th Cong., 2D Sess. 1, 3 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5750, 5752.
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U.S.C. section 101, as discussed above, are broad in scope and pro-
vide little guidance for inventors seeking to protect inventions in
biotechnology. The copyright statute is equally devoid of any defi-
nition of biotechnology. A clear definition of what is the approp-
riate subject matter for legal protection is essential for a meaningful
statutory provision.
The definition of "biotechnology" found in proposed Amend-
ment Section 190 provides a basis for discerning proper subject mat-
ter under the patent law. Notably, it contains mens rea
requirements which become the foundation of the statute. The in-
tent requirements incorporated into the definition of "biotechno-
logy" are an expression of a concept behind patent and copyright
laws that ideas and products of nature are not subject matter af-
forded protection. Under the proposed Section 190, an inventor
may still obtain patent protection, absent a showing of intent, by
demonstrating a useful result.
Recall that the principle underlying forms of legal protection,
such as the patent and copyright laws, is that there is an inherent
trade-off between the granting of legal monopoly as a reward to the
inventor and the benefit to society derived from the existence of the
invention itself.I" The principles of that trade-off are incorporated
in the proposed Amendment by allowing a patent based on poten-
tial use, as long as there is some demonstrated application for the
invention."1
Proposed Amendment Section 191(a) contains a reiteration of
the basic language found in 35 U.S.C. section 101.112 The terms
"process", "manufacture" and "composition of matter" were cho-
sen from the 35 U.S.C. section 101 enumerations for their succinct
definitions of three important areas of biotechnology protection: a
process (such as a new technique in genetic engineering); an article
of manufacture (or product such as an antibody); and, a composi-
tion of nature (such as a new microorganism). The two-fold process
of identifying an invention and its results, assists in identifying those
inventions which qualify under this proposed Amendment. Despite
the overlap in language between this proposed Amendment Section
191(a) and 35 U.S.C. section 101, the second requirement of bio-
technology origin dispels any confusion which may result.
110. Stem, The Bundle of Rights Suited to New Technology, 47 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1229
(1986).
111. See supra notes 30 and 31 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 26.
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2. Unanticipated Products/Unexpected Results
The problem of being barred from obtaining a patent on a
product obtained by using methods known in the art, similar to the
situation in Ex parte Goodall,"3 can be resolved through statutory
amendment. Proposed Amendment Section 191(b) is drafted to
avoid just such situations. This Section works in conjunction with
proposed Amendment Section 191(a) to protect an inventor of a
process from claims to unanticipated products resulting from use of
a patented process.
An inventor should not benefit or extend the life of a patent by
withholding information from the public. 4 On the other hand, an
inventor will be less likely to seek patent protection, and disclose
potentially valuable information to the public, if there is uncertainty
over whether all modes or forms of a claimed invention have been
anticipated and protected. The avoidance and resolution of such
conflicts is the purpose of proposed Amendment Section 191(b).
B. The Application Process
1. Expedited Review
One of the primary problems identified in legal protection for
biotechnology is the extremely slow rate of processing patent appli-
cations relative to the rapid rate of growth in the industry. In many
instances, this has resulted in reliance on trade secret law for legal
protection, instead of patent or copyright protection.
One disadvantage to relying exclusively upon trade secret law
for legal protection is that a trade secret is only protected for as
long as it is kept secret."' If a product containing trade secret ma-
terial is sold, in public use, or offered for sale over one year, the
inventor is barred from obtaining patent protection due to the 35
U.S.C. section 102 "novelty" requirement." 6
Proposed Amendment Section 192 formally establishes a Bio-
technology Group within the PTO. The primary reason for for-
mally establishing a separate biotechnology group," 7 is to assure
113. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
114. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1988).
115. See generally, CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPO-
LIES (1988).
116. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
117. In April, 1988, the Patent Office was expected to consolidate branches reviewing
proteins, diagnostics and asexually produced plants with the organic chemistry and biotech-
nology examining group to create a biotechnology "supergroup." See Crawford, supra note
6, at 723.
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that applications for biotechnology patents will receive immediate
review. Expedited review is necessary for this proposed form of
legal protection to remain viable in this fast-paced industry.
Another reason for establishing a separate group is to attract
Patent Examiners with biotechnology backgrounds. To date, in or-
der to practice before the PTO one must satisfy certain technical
background requirements. 1 ' Historically, these requirements have
been restricted to chemical and engineering fields of undergraduate
and graduate studies." 9 The establishment of the separate biotech-
nology group will allow the PTO to accept attorneys with biology
backgrounds, and to provide a place for them to exercise their
expertise.
2. Deposit Requirement
The benefits and detriments of depositing in biotechnology pat-
ent applications, as discussed above, has been the subject of much
litigation in this area of law. 120 At first blush, the deposit require-
ment may seem to present an undue burden upon an inventor.
However, it is a legitimate requirement in instances where a starting
material is not known or readily available to the public.' 2' The re-
quirement is incorporated into the proposed Amendment Section
194.
The purpose of the enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. sec-
tion 112 is to assure that once the patent grant expires, the subject
matter of the patent will then become readily available to the pub-
iec. The trade-off is a legal monopoly now, in return for dedication
of the invention to the public in seventeen years. To balance the
conflict between placing an undue burden upon an inventor and
sabotaging the public's future rights in an invention, a provision is
118. 37 C.F.R. § 10.7 (1988).
119. As part of the application packet for the October, 1988 Patent Agent Examination,
issued by the PTO, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued this statement:
A person seeking admission to the examination must demonstrate that he or
she possesses the scientific and technical training necessary to enable him or
her to render applicants for patents valuable service. A person will be admitted
to take the examination if he or she can show that he or she received a bache-
lor's degree or the equivalent thereof in one of the following subjects from a
United States college or university of recognized standing: Applied Physical
Science; Electronics; Engineering (Aeronautical, Agricultural, Ceramic, Chem-
ical, including Electrochemical, Civil, Electrical, Engineering Physics, Geolog-
ical, Industrial, Mechanical, Metallurgical, Mining, Nuclear, Petroleum);
General Chemistry; Marine Technology; Organic Chemistry; Physics; Textile
Technology.
120. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
121. Lundak, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 93.
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included in proposed Amendment Section 194(c), which allows an
inventor to petition for a waiver of the deposit requirement.
Consistent with the decision in Ex parte Jackson,122 an inven-
tor, under the Amendment Section 194, must deposit the determi-
nant element in a process patent with a Federal depository. The
rationale behind this seemingly rigid requirement reflects back to
the policy statements of the concurring opinion in Argoudelis.23
Since it is uncertain whether a new bacteria or new antibiotic will be
of value to the public at the expiration of a patent, public policy
dictates that there be access to the useful portion of an invention. 24
By making deposits part of a biotechnology patent application,
the PTO may exercise control over the deposit material. The poten-
tial of deposited material, as disclosure, becoming non-enabling led
to concern over control of deposited material.' 25 By retaining con-
trol over deposited materials, the PTO may regulate applications
for accessing deposited cultures and thus assuage the concerns of
both the PTO and inventors.
As expressed by the court in In re Lundak, requiring an appli-
cant to deposit before filing may "easily.. .be subverted by the dis-
honest, while being unnecessary to the honest."' 126 However,
litigation in this area has primarily revolved around the exact time
in the application process at which a deposit is absolutely necessary.
It is generally accepted that deposited materials must be avail-
able to the public at the time the patent issues.'2 7 By allowing an
applicant to deposit at any time prior to issue would be arbitrary
and unreliable. Thus, proposed Amendment Section 194 requires
that an applicant deposit material within six months from the date
of filing an application. Proposed Amendment Section 194(b) al-
lows an applicant to petition the Commissioner for extensions of
time, not to exceed the date of issuance. This provision provides for
consistency and fairness to the inventor.
122. Jackson, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 804.
123. Argoudelis, 434 F.2d at 1394. See also supra notes 71 and 72 and accompanying
text.
124. For example, if a bacteria is genetically altered to make a new antibiotic, perhaps
only the new antibody will be of feasible commercial value and demand in the future. If only
the starting material for the bacteria is available, the progress of technology is pushed back
one step further than necessary.
125. Argoudelis, 434 F.2d at 1394; See also In re Metcalfe, 56 C.C.P.A. 1191, 410 F.2d
1378, 161 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 792 (CCPA 1969).
126. Lundak, 227 U.S.P.Q. 90.
127. See Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390; Jackson, 217 U.S.P.Q. 805.
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C. Duration
The duration of a patent is seventeen years from the date a
patent issues.1 28 Rights under a copyright registration generally ex-
tend for fifty years beyond the life of the author.1 29 Proposed
Amendment Section 195 provides for a bifurcated duration: ten
years beyond the life of the inventor for any "new and original"
invention under proposed Section 191(a); ten years for any "new
and useful improvement" under proposed Section 191(b).
The reason for granting a significantly shorter duration for im-
provement patents is based on the assumption that it is easier to
improve upon a known process or product than it is to create a new
product or process. There is a strong underlying policy argument
to be made for not allowing some to benefit from the effort of
others. The distinction between mere "improvement" and novel
"invention" is a question of fact which may possibly introduce more
uncertainty than the courts are willing to resolve.
The primary reason for providing a duration extending beyond
the life of an inventor is to assure that an issued patent has some
commercial value. That is, a company will be more likely to pay
royalties to an inventor for a patent which will not expire for ten
years - assuming the inventor is alive at the time of licensing.
However, were the patent grant for the life of an inventor only, a
licensee's rights to an invention could dissolve at any time. The
uncertainty and potentially short license term would significantly,
and negatively, impact the economics of biotechnology inventions.
If the duration of a patent is ten years beyond the life of the
inventor, as in the proposed Amendment, it is necessary to include
some provision for keeping records pertaining to the death of an
inventor. Proposed Amendment Section 195(c) provides for op-
tional recordation of the death or related statements concerning an
inventor. The Register of Copyrights was established under Title
17, and the need to establish a separate Register for recording the
death of inventors seems unwarranted.
Further, if an inventor is not alive to benefit from the inven-
tion, a ten year time period will place the invention in public do-
main sooner. Given the high turn-over rate of products, and the
fast pace of developments in the biotechnology industry, the shorter
128. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1987). Design patents carry a 14 year term.
129. 17 U.S.C. § 302a (1987); Work made for hire has a duration of 75 years beyond the
date of publication, or 100 years beyond the date of creation, whichever is shorter. 17 U.S.C.
§ 302c (1987).
[Vol. 5
PROTECTING BIOTECHNOLOGY
ten year grant will expire about the time a product resulting from a
patent peaks on the market.
Given that the average life cycle of a pharmaceutical is be-
tween eight and twelve years, 130 ten years seems to be a fair com-
promise between industry desires and public needs. The caveat
incorporated for products or utilities derived from new or existing
process patents is, as noted above, to allow an inventor to enjoy the
limited legal monopoly granted by the patent laws before a competi-
tor can obtain an improvement patent.
The counter-argument for short-term protection beyond the
life of the inventor is that biotechnology is a high-growth market at
the present, and will soon plateau. When it does, the influx of bio-
technology inventions into the PTO will decrease, and there will be
a need for longer-term protection for adequate competition in the
marketplace. If Congress deems it necessary at that time, an
amendment to the duration provisions may be made according to
need.
V. CONCLUSION
Due to the nature of the industry, inventions in biotechnology
require a responsive and flexible system of legal protection. While
current patent law appears to grant necessary legal protection, the
delay in patent prosecution and the inadequate training of Patent
Examiners and attorneys renders patent protection less than opti-
mal. Copyright protection is too limited for the needs of the bio-
technology industry. Thus, a hybrid of the two legal monopolies,
such as the Amendment herein proposed, seems appropriate.
This proposed Amendment to Title 35 attempts to provide the
protection required by the biotechnology industry. The proposed
Amendment has a mens rea requirement to narrow the scope of
protection. That is, a patent on a particular monoclonal antibody
directed to one antigen having a specific physiological effect, will
not preclude a patent on a different type of monoclonal antibody
having the same physiological effect.
The proposed Amendment also establishes a Biotechnology
Group within the Patent and Trademark Office to assure that appli-
cations are processed rapidly to accommodate the growth rate pecu-
liar to the biotechnology industry. The Group assures that Patent
Examiners have the appropriate technological background to give
constructive feedback to inventors during the application process.
130. See supra note 5.
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A balance between the economic needs of scientists and the
public interest in the advancement of science can be addressed
through appropriate legislation. While statutes, such as the one
proposed in this comment, may be useful guidelines, it is up to pat-
ent attorneys to assure that the law remains simple enough to be
effective. Today, laws either enacted through the legislature or es-
tablished through the courts, need not be "enemies of innovation."
PROTECTING BIOTECHNOLOGY
APPENDIX:
A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO TITLE 35131
§ 190 - DEFINITIONS
Biotechnology, as used in this Amendment, shall refer to a pro-
cess by which the genetic composition of an organism is intention-
ally altered by means of chemical, biological or other manipulations
available to the art, and any end-product thereof; or the process by
which an organism known to naturally produce an end-product is
intentionally altered to produce an altered end-product, and any re-
sulting end-product thereof; or a product which is the intentional
result of a purification process. The term "biotechnology" shall
also refer to a chemical, a biological composition, or a microbial,
multicellular or monocellular, viral or bacterial organism, of useful
or demonstrated potential application in a significant field of human
endeavor or need.
§ 191 - PATENTS FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY
(a) Whoever invents or discovers any new and original pro-
cess, manufacture or composition of matter through the use of or
resulting in biotechnology products may obtain a patent therefore,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this Title.
(b) Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful im-
provement on an existing biotechnology invention may obtain a pat-
ent thereon, subject to the conditions and requirements of this Title.
(c) The provisions of this Title relating to patents for inven-
tions shall apply to patents for biotechnology, except as otherwise
herein provided.
§ 192 - BIOTECHNOLOGY GROUP: ESTABLISHMENT
There shall be in the Patent and Trademark Office a Biotech-
nology Group dedicated to reviewing applications under this
Amendment. The Commissioner shall appoint a Group Director
for the Biotechnology Group.
§ 193 - PROCESSING OF APPLICATION
Applications for'biotechnology patents shall be reviewed by the
special Group established in Section 192. Every reasonable effort
shall be made by the Group Director to expedite the issuance of
patents under this Section.
131. The following proposed amendment to Title 35 is a combination of 35 U.S.C. and
17 U.S.C., including the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act. Although the bulk of the
proposed Amendment is language derived from Title 35, the astute reader will recognize key
elements from the other Title. Additional materials are referenced within the text of the
statute.
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§ 194 - DEPOSIT OF MATERIALS
(a) When an invention or any claims in a patent application
covering an invention depend on the use of microorganisms which
are not known or not readily available to the public, the applicant
shall deposit such material with a Federal depository132 not later
than six months from the date of filing said application. Failure to
deposit within the required time may result in withholding issuance
of the patent.
(b) Upon petition by applicant, the Commissioner shall grant
an extension of time for depositing any materials required under
subsection (b). In no instance shall such extensions be granted be-
yond the date of issuance.
(c) The deposit requirement may be waived by the Commis-
sioner upon petition by applicant and demonstration by applicant
that the requirements of Section 112 of this Title have been suffi-
ciently satisfied so as to enable any person skilled in the art to which
the invention pertains, or with which it is nearly connected, to make
or use the invention.
§ 195 - DURATION OF PATENT
(a) Biotechnology patents under Section 191(a) shall be for a
term of ten years beyond the life of the inventor as measured from
the date the patent issues.
(b) In the case of a joint invention, the patent endures for a
term consisting of ten years beyond the life of the last surviving
inventor.
(c) Any person having an interest in a biotechnology process
patent may at any time record in the Patent and Trademark Office a
statement of the date of death of the inventor of the patented bio-
technology invention, or a statement that the inventor is still living
on a particular date. The statement shall identify the person filing
it, the nature of that person's interest, and the source of the infor-
mation recorded, and shall comply in form and content with re-
quirements that the Patent and Trademark Office shall prescribe by
regulation. The Patent and Trademark Office shall maintain cur-
rent records of information relating to the death of inventors of bio-
technology inventions upon which patents have been granted, based
on such recorded statements.
(d) Biotechnology patents under Section 191(b) shall be
granted for a term of ten years as measured from the date the patent
issues.
132. Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP), section 608.01(p)(c)(1985).
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(e) No patent shall be filed dependent on an existing process
patent within ten years of first issue of said process patent absent an
express grant by the owner of said process patent.
(f) Protection under this Amendment shall terminate if the
application for biotechnology patent protection is not filed within
two years after the date on which the subject matter of the patent is
first in public use, sold or offered for sale in this or a foreign
country.
§ 196 - GRANT
In the case of biotechnology patents, the grant shall be of the
right to exclude others from making, selling or using the product or
process, subject to the provisions of section 195.
§ 197 - EFFECT ON ISSUED PATENTS AND PENDING
APPLICATIONS
The provisions of this Amendment do not affect patents issued,
applications filed, or any other matter initiated before the Patent
and Trademark Office prior to the effective date of this
Amendment.
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